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DIAMOND HANDS AND REGULATORY
DEMANDS: GAMESTOP AND THE
SHORTCOMING OF CURRENT
SECURITIES REGULATION
Jacob Gremillion

I.

INTRODUCTION

Since its formation under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC") primary
function has been overseeing organizations and individuals in the
securities market.1 The SEC uses securities regulations to promote
disclosure of market-related information, fair dealing, and protection against fraud.2 For the last 86 years, the SEC has maintained
the same three part mission: protecting investors, maintaining fair,
3
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitating capital formation.
The current state of securities regulation fails to maintain fair, orderly markets and this in turn hurts retail investors. These failures
are evidenced by the events that caused the extreme volatility of
GameStop Corporation's stock ("GME").
On January 28, 2021, GME traded at an all-time high of
$483 per share, a 18,700% increase from its low of $2.57 per share
less than a year before. 4 Soon after reaching $483 per share, Robinhood Financial LLC ("Robinhood") and several other commission
free trading platforms implemented trading restrictions that prohibited customers from purchasing additional shares of select securities, namely GME and the like.5 These restrictions caused a
' See What We Do, SEC (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwe-do.
2

Id.

3 Id.
https://finance.yaFIN.,
YAHOO
(GME),
Corp.
GameStop
hoo.corm/chart/GME.
' See Dave Michaels, SEC to Review Brokers' Restrictions on GameStop,
AMC Trading, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2021) https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-to4
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widespread panic which resulted in a 77% decrease in GME's
share price in the span of a few hours.6 The extreme volatility resulted in a few individuals profiting significantly in a relatively
short span of time whereas numerous other investors were left
"holding the bag". GME's share price did not represent the fundamentals of the failing retailer and instead only reached these levels
due to a combination of outside circumstances. Current regulation
fails to prevent similar events from occurring in the future. In order
to prevent the recurrence of these events, the SEC must amend
current regulation with a focus on increasing transparency, maintaining orderly markets, and protecting retail investors.
This article will primarily discuss the events that led to
GME's extreme volatility, the shortcomings of current securities
regulation, and proposed changes to current regulation that better
protects retail investors. The first section will review the events
that resulted in the extreme volatility of GME. More specifically,
it will explore securities regulations intended to protect consumers
and how these regulations failed to prevent extreme volatility.. The
second section will briefly explore the concerns raised during the
House Committee on Financial Services hearing for GameStop.
The final section will propose changes to current regulation that
better protect consumers. More specifically, these proposals are to
produce a more transparent, free, and fair market that adequately
protects retail investors.

II.

GAMESTOP'S EXTREME PRICE
VOLATILITY

A combination of outside circumstances lead to the extreme
volatility of GME and several other similarly situated securities.
This section will review the events surrounding GME's volatility
and applicable regulations that allowed these events to occur.
A. Short Squeeze
Starting as early as August 2019, a group of amateur investors began posting about the upside potential of GME on the online

review-brokers-restrictions-on-gamestop-amc-trading- 11611932473 ?mod=article_inline.
6See

id.
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forum WallStreetBets.7 One user noted that Michael Burry, the investor who famously bet against mortgage securities before the
late-2000s financial crisis, built a stake in GME through his investment firm Scion Asset Management LLC. 8 The user claimed that
Burry was "trying to start an epic short squeeze".9 A short squeeze
occurs when a company's stock price begins to increase which, inturn, forces investors that have short positions against the stock to
buy back shares at a loss, leading to further increases in the stock
price. 10 WallStreetBets users repeatedly posted that GME could be
a repeat of the "Mother of all Squeezes" that occurred in 2008 when
a short squeeze of Volkswagen stock lead to thirty billion dollars'
worth of losses for hedge funds."
Starting in August 2020, Ryan Cohen, the co-founder of
Chewy Inc., began to build a position in GME.12 Cohen grew his
13
position to 9.98% of the outstanding shares of GME. In November 2020, Cohen sent a letter to GameStop's board, urging it to
conduct a strategic review and to provide stockholders with a cred14
ible roadmap for cost containment and a return to profitability.
He further urged the company to cut excessive real estate costs, sell
non-core operations in foreign markets, and hire talented people to
transform the company.15
Following Ryan Cohen's open letter to the board, members
of WallStreetBets frequently made posts placing their support

' See Dave Michaels, GameStop Frenzy PromptsSEC to Weigh More Short
Sale Transparency, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 17, 2021) https://www.wsj.com/arti-

cles/gamestop-frenzy-prompts-sec-to-weigh-more-short-sale-transparency11613593827.
8

Id

9 Id.
1 See

Key Points About Regulation SHO,

SEC

(Apr.

8,

2015)

https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/regsho.htm.
11 See Hedge funds lose $30 billion on VW infinity squeeze, MOX
REPORTS (Dec. 9, 2018) https://moxreports.com/vw-infinity-squeeze/.
" Kenneth Squire, Former Chewy CEO tries to push GameStop to become
the Amazon of the video-game industry, CNBC (Nov. 21, 2020)
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/20/former-chewy-ceo-ryan-cohen-urgesgamestop-to-become-the-amazon-of-video-games. html.
13 Id.
14
15

Id
Id.
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behind GME.16 These posts claimed the over shorted nature of the
stock paired with the work of activist investor Ryan Cohen made
GME a perfect buying opportunity." Posts on WallStreetBets
touted GME's short interest as high as 141%, making it an ideal
candidate for a short squeeze. 18 Put plainly, over 100% of the available shares for purchase in GME were sold short.
Short sellers borrow shares from brokers and then sell them
into the market with the agreement that they will buy the shares
back and return them to the lender at an agreed upon time. 19 Currently, there is no mechanism in place that prevents the same
shares from being sold short multiples times, therefore, it is possible to have short interest higher than the entire float of a corporation. 20

Regulation SHO was first adopted in 2005 to update short
sale regulation due to significant market developments that had
occurred since short sale regulation was initially adopted in 1938.21
Since its adoption, the SEC has amended the regulation several
times attempting to eliminate exceptions and strengthen requirements surrounding short selling. 2 Following the mid-2000s financial crisis, the SEC adopted Rule 201 of Regulation SHO which
was an attempt to further restrict short selling.23 Rule 201 restricts
the price short sales may be effected in order to prevent potentially
manipulative or abusive short selling that drives down the price of
a security.2 4 As part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, the SEC was ordered to issue rules
within two years that would enhance public information about the

16

See

generally

https.//www.reddit.com/r/wallstreet-

(showing popular posts on
bets/search?q=Ryan%20Cohen&restrict_sr=1
WallStreetBets discussing Ryan Cohen).
17 Id
18 Megan Davies, Short interest in GameStop declined to 15% vs 141% at
peak - S3, REUTERS (Mar. 24, 2021) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-retailtrading-gamestop-short/short-interest-in-gamestop-declined-to-15-vs-141-at-

peak-s3-idUSKBN2 BG28H.

See SEC, Key Points About Regulation SHO, supra note 10.
20 See id.
21 See id.
19

22

See id.

See 17 CFR § 242.201; See also SEC, Key PointsAbout Regulation SHO,
supranote 10.
24 Id
23
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lending or borrowing of securities.25 It has been eleven years and
these rules have yet to be implemented. 26 GME is proof that current regulation does not adequately prevent abusive short selling.
B. Commission Free TradingPlatforms
Commission free trading platforms have made the stock
market accessible to a whole new segment of retail investors. These
gamified trading platforms are readily accessible from cell phones
and are typically used by less experienced investors." The influx
of less knowledgeable investors using apps like Robinhood paired
with widespread social media buzz led to an ever increasing number of retail investors piling into GameStop. 28
The influx of retail investors purchasing shares of GME
combined with options contracts that were far out of the money
added fuel to the ever increasing likelihood of a short squeeze.29
GME's share price began rapidly increasing mid-January which
drove institutional investors to purchase shares of the stock in order to cover their short positions. 30 Institutional investors closing
short positions combined with inexperienced retail investors' fear
2s

See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(2) (2012); see also Michaels, GameStop Frenzy

Prompts SEC to Weigh More Short Sale Transparency, supranote 7.
26

Id

27

See Christine Indzelis, Robinhood Allegedly Lures InexperiencedInves-

tors, Fails to ProperlyScreen for Options Trading, Massachusetts Complaint
Says, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Dec. 16, 2020) https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/articlefb 1pq03 7y4pd6yr/Robinhood-Allegedly-Lures-InexperiencedInvestors-Fails-to-Properly-Screen-for-Options-Trading-Massachusetts-Complaint-Says (finding "68 percent of the company's Massachusetts customers approved for options trading have limited or no investment experience").
28

See Sam Rega, How Robinhood and Covid opened the floodgates for 13

7,
2020)
(Oct.
CNBC
traders,
stock
amateur
million
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/07/how-robinhood-and-covid-introduced-mil-

lions-to-the-stock-market.html.
See Ben Bain, GameStop Prompts U.S. to ConsiderNew Rules for Options, Shorts, BLOOMBERG L.P. (Mar. 9, 2021) https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/gamestop-prompts-u-s-to-consider-new-rules-for-options-shorts; see also InvestorBulletin: An Introduction to Options, SEC (Mar.
18, 2015) https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ibintroduction29

options.html ("Option holders risk the entire amount of the premium paid to
purchase the option. If a holder's option expires "out-of-the-money" the entire
premium will be lost.").
3 GameStop
Corp.
(GME),
YAHOO
FIN.,
https://finance.yahoo.com/chart/GME.
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of missing out led to GME's share price reaching an all time high
of $483 on January 28th, 2021.31
C. TradingRestrictions
On the morning on January 28th, Robinhood and several
other commission free trading platforms implemented trading restrictions that prohibited customers from purchasing additional
shares of select securities, namely GME and the like.32 Investors
holding these securities were left with only two options, hold or
sell. These restrictions, which primarily effected retail investors,
resulted in GME's share price plummeting 77% from its intra-day
high by market close.3 3 At the time the trading restrictions were
implemented, the platforms failed to provide users with an explanation for the restrictions.3 4
These companies later announced that the trading restrictions stemmed from mandates implemented by their clearinghouses.35 Clearinghouses process the transaction on the back end
after a user executes a trade.3 6 Clearinghouses are required to put
up collateral on behalf of the broker and customer to help facilitate
the trade as an intermediary.3 7 Because clearinghouses are required to put up collateral, the broker is required to make deposits
in order to use the clearinghouse's services. Moreover, clearinghouse deposit requirements fluctuate based on volatility in the
markets. 38 Anthony Denier, CEO of the commission free trading
platform Webull, reported its clearinghouse was requiring a collateral requirement of nearly 100% for transactions of GameStop due

31'I

32 See Michaels, SEC to Review Brokers'Restrictions on GameStop, supra

note 5.
33

Id.

3 See id
35 See Caitlin McCabe, GameStop Trading Restrictions Blamed on Wall
Street's Clearing Firm by Online Broker, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2021)
https://www.wsj .com/articles/gamestop-trading-restrictions-blamed-on-wallstreets-clearing-firm-by-online-broker-11611867105; see also FinancialClearing Houses, CFA INST. https://www.cfainstitute.org/en/advocacy/issues/central-clearing-houses.
36 See id.
37

38

See id
See id.
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to the extreme volatility surrounding the security at the time the
trading restrictions were implemented.3 9
The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation ("DTCC"),
which operates the clearinghouses for U.S. stock and bond trades,
issued a statement that the volatility in stocks like GameStop and
AMC has "generated substantial risk exposures at firms that clear
these trades". 4 0 This risk was especially pronounced for firms
whose customers were primarily on one side of a trade, either heavily betting for a stock to rise or fall.4 ' The DTCC further stated that
"margin requirements protect the entire industry against defaults
and systemic risk in volatile markets."4 While margin requirements are necessary to protect the market as a whole, the current
settlement cycle of two business days, "T+2", unnecessarily ties up
the deposit until the transaction is settled.4 3
Every broker conducting a general securities business registered with the SEC must comply with the Net Capital Rule."
The Net Capital Rule is designed to protect the customers of a broker from losses that can be incurred upon a broker's collapse by
requiring the broker to have adequate liquid assets to meet its obligations to investors and liabilities to other creditors.45 While firms
like Robinhood had substantial cash reserves on hand, the Net
Capital Rule prevented these firms from using that cash to settle
clearinghouse deposit requirements. Robinhood was forced to raise
more than $1 billion to meet its clearinghouse deposit requirements
before lifting the trading restrictions it implemented.4 6

39 Id.
40 Id
41 Id
42

Id

43 See SEC Adopts T+2 Settlement Cycle for Securities Transactions, SEC
(Mar. 22, 2017) https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-68-0.
44 See
NET CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR BROKERS OR
DEALERS SEA Rule 15c3-1, FINRA (2008) https://www.finra.org/sites/de-

fault/files/sea-rule-15 c3-1-interpretations.pdf.
45 Id
46 Peter Rudegeair & Orla McCaffrey, Robinhood Raises $1 Billion to
Meet
SurgingCash Demands, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2021) https://www.wsj.com/articles/robinhood-raises- 1-billion-to-meet-surging-cash-demands11611928504?mod=articleinline.
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D. Payment for OrderFlow
The events surrounding GameStop led to the SEC, several
members of Congress, and the mainstream media questioning the
method Robinhood uses to generate revenue. Robinhood generates
the majority of its revenue from a process called Payment for Order Flow ("PFOF").4 7 PFOF is a decades old method of transferring some of the profit generated from the market making process
to the broker that routed a customer's order to that market
maker. 48 These profits are typically fractions of a penny per share
routed from the broker.4 9 Brokers often pass some of this profit to
the customer who placed the order in the form of a "price improvement". 0
The SEC has previously noted that PFOF can lead to potential conflicts of interest for brokers because of the tension between the firm's interests in maximizing payment for order flow,
i.e., profits, and their fiduciary duty to route customer's orders to
the best markets." Brokers have a duty of Best Execution which
legally requires it to seek the best price reasonably available for its
customers' orders.52
The SEC has previously given PFOF its stamp of approval,
but current events have led to it rethinking that position.5 3 SEC
Acting Chairwoman Allison Herren Lee said regulators should examine such arrangements to make sure practices are fully disclosed
and "consistent with best execution obligations."5 4 Critics of PFOF
say the practice breeds bad incentives because it tempts brokers

4 See How Robinhood Makes Money, Robinhood Fin. LLC. (2021)
https://robinhood.com/us/en/support/articles/how-robinhood-makes-money/.
48 See Special Study: Payment for Order Flow and Internalization
in the
Options Markets, SEC (Dec. 2000) https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ordpay.htm.
* See id

5 See id.
51

d

See Best Execution, SEC (May 9, 2011) https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersbestexhtm.html; see also Commission InterpretationRegarding
Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers, SEC (June 5, 2019)
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2019/ia-5248.pdf.
5 See Dave Michaels, GameStop Saga Prompts SEC to Weigh Review of
Payment for OrderFlow, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/gamestop-saga-prompts-sec-to-weigh-review-of-payment-for-order-flow11615316739.
52

54

Id
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into sending customer orders to the market maker that pays the
highest rate." The number of brokers using PFOF has led to a significant increase in trades that are executed off of public exchanges; a record 47.2% of trading volume in January was executed away from public exchanges, up from 39.9% a year earlier.56
Trades executed off public exchanges have less transparency and
can increase the risk that a customer is not receiving the best price
for a trade.5

III. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL

SERVICES HEARING
GameStop's extreme price volatility led to the House Committee on Financial Services calling a hearing to discuss the circumstances that led to these events. This section will briefly discuss a few of the main concerns raised during this hearing.
A. TradingRestrictionsand CapitalRequirements
Increased clearinghouse deposit requirements due to market volatility forced affected brokers to implement trading restrictions that negatively affected retail investors." During the
hearing, Ken Griffin, CEO of Citadel LLC, was asked whether or
not an instantaneous settlement cycle would have solved the problem that resulted in trading restrictions being implemented. 59 Mr.
Griffin stressed the difficulties surrounding an instantaneous settlement cycle but admitted instantaneous settlement would have
prevented the concerns surrounding clearinghouse deposits.60 Citing the difficulty of implementing instantaneous settlement, Mr.
Griffin repeatedly pushed for a "T+1" settlement cycle which
would result in deposits becoming available the next trading
5 See id.
Alexander Osipovich, GameStop Mania Highlights Shift to Dark Trading, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 12, 2021) https://www.wsj.com/articles/gamestop-maniahighlights-shift-to-dark-trading-11613125 980?mod=article_inline.
5 See Asad Bhatti, Lighting up the Dark:Hidden Trends In Off-Exchange
Trading, CBOE (July 15, 2020) https://www.cboe.com/insights/posts/lightingup-the-dark-hidden-trends-in-off-exchange-trading/.
56

See McCabe, supra note 35.
59 See Game Stopped? Who Wins andLoses When ShortSellers, SocialMe58

dia, and Retail Investors Collide, Part 1 Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
117th Cong. (2021) (statement of Ken Griffin, CEO, Citadel LLC).
60

Seeid
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day. 61 Moreover, Vlad Tenev, CEO of Robinhood, expressed his
belief that real time settlement would have prevented this situation
from occurring. 62
B. Payment for OrderFlow andBest Execution
PFOF is the method of transferring some of the trading
profits from the market making process to the broker that routed
a customer's order to that market maker. 63 PFOF was discussed
extensively during the House Committee on Financial Services
hearing for GameStop. 64 Several members of Congress called into
question the relationship between market makers and brokers that
resulted in Citadel paying brokers $700 million to execute customer orders, how market makers balance Best Execution requirements while profiting from order flow, and the impacts PFOF has
on the quality of trade execution retail investors receive. 65
Throughout the hearing, PFOF was defended as a legal practice
that benefits customers through price improvement and the innovation that resulted in commission free trading. 66 While Mr. Griffin claimed Citadel LLC has vigorously advocated for execution
quality and plays by the rules of the road regarding PFOF, he
failed to address concerns that PFOF fails to satisfy Best Execution requirements. 67
C. FinancialTransaction Tax
Representative Rashida Tlaib questioned witnesses about a
financial transaction tax ("FTT") and the benefits of a FTT such
as preventing fraud, market manipulation, or market volatility. 68
See id. (statement of Ken Griffin, CEO, Citadel LLC) (discussing the difficulties of instantaneous settlement and the requirement for synchronization
between all parties due to instantaneous settlement eliminating time to recover
in the event of a mistake).
62 See id (statement of Vlad Tenev, CEO, Robinhood
Fin. LLC).
63 See SEC, Special Study: Payment for OrderFlow and
Internalizationin
the OptionsMarkets, supranote 48.
64 See Game Stopped? Who Wins and Loses When Short
Sellers, SocialMedia, and Retail Investors Collide, Part 1 Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
117th Cong. (2021).
61

65

See id.

66

Seeid
See id. (statement of Ken Griffin, CEO, Citadel LLC).
See id. (statement of Congresswoman Rashida Tlaib).

67
68
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The witnesses in attendance rebutted Rep. Tlaib's claims that a
FTT would have any of these purported benefits. Moreover, the
proposed 0.1 percent tax may seem like a small imposition on investors, but this tax would hurt average consumers, their longterm retirement goals, and would do nothing to address market

volatility.69

IV. PROPOSED REGULATION CHANGES
This section will discuss proposed changes to current regulations in an attempt to better protect consumers and to prevent
the occurrence of future events that result in extreme market volatility.
A. TradingRestrictions and CapitalRequirements
The trading restrictions implemented by Robinhood, and
other similar commission free brokers, resulted in a 77% drop in
the price of GME over the course of a few hours. Increased clearinghouse deposit requirements due to market volatility along with
Net Capital Requirements left the affected brokers with one option, place restrictions on customer orders. 70 Currently, clearinghouse deposit requirements and Net Capital requirements both
provide adequate protection to consumers and the market as a
whole; therefore, these requirements should remain unchanged.7 1
In financial markets, the current settlement period is "T+2",
i.e., the trade date plus two days.7 2 This settlement period ties up
clearinghouse deposits for two business days after a trade is executed instead of being readily available to settle additional trades.
While there are many challenges with implementing a "T+0" settlement cycle, if it were the current standard, brokers would not
have needed to implement trading restrictions." The SEC should

69

See id; see generallyColin Miller & Anna Tyger, The Impact ofa Finan-

cial Transaction Tax, TAx FOUND. (Jan. 23, 2020) https://taxfoundation.org/financial-transaction-tax/ (discussing unforeseen harms of an FTT).
70

See McCabe, supranote 35.

" See id
72 See SEC, SEC Adopts T+2 Settlement Cycle for Securities Transactions,
supra note 51.
7 See Griffin, supranote 66; see also DTCCPROPOSESAPPROACH TO

SHORTENING U.S. SETTLEMENT CYCLE TO T+1 WITHIN 2 YEARS,
DTCC

(Feb

24,

2021)

https://www.dtcc.com/news/2021/february/24/dtcc-
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DiamondHands andRegulatoryDemands

417

commission a study to identify the risks associated with instantaneous settlement, ensure potential risks can be mitigated by brokers, and adopt an amendment to shorten the standard settlement
cycle to instantaneous settlement.
B. Payment for OrderFlow andBest Execution
The concept of PFOF conflicts with the Duty of Best Execution. PFOF can lead to potential conflicts of interest for brokers
because of the tension between the firm's interests in maximizing
payment for order flow, i.e., profits, and their fiduciary duty to
route customer's orders to the best markets.74 Brokers have a duty
of Best Execution which legally requires it to seek the best price
reasonably available for its customers' orders. PFOF drives order
flow away from public exchanges and instead routes that flow to
market makers. Market makers do not offer the same level of
transparency as public exchanges and therefore increases the
chance of an order being filled at a suboptimal price.
To ensure that orders are fulfilled at the best possible price,
the SEC should adopt an amendment that forces all retail order
flow onto public exchanges and bans any sort of rebate associated
with the execution of trades, including PFOF. Forcing all retail
flow onto a public exchange allows the transparency necessary to
ensure a broker meets its Duty of Best Execution. The CFA Institute reported that after the UK banned PFOF, retail trades executed at the best-quoted price increased from 65% to 90%.75
C. Short Sales
Unchecked short selling created a situation where
GameStop had short interest higher than the entire float of the corporation. 76 Increased transparency and disclosures could prevent
similar situations from occurring, but some investors claim too
much transparency could have a negative impact on the practice

proposes-approach-to-shortening-us-settlement-cycle-to-t1-within-two-years
(identifying risks associated with decreasing settlement cycles).
" See SEC, Special Study: Payment for OrderFlow and Internalizationin
the OptionsMarkets, supra note 48.

" See Sviatoslav Rosov, PAYMENT FOR ORDER FLOW IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM, CFA INST. (June 2016) https://www.cfainstitute.org//medialdocuments/article/position-paper/payment-for-order-flow-united-kingdom.ashx.
76 See Davies, supranote 18.
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that serves beneficial roles." On the other hand, Nasdaq Inc. endorses increased disclosures of short positions for institutional investors, claiming the increased disclosure would help public companies engage with investors working behind the scenes to drive
down share prices. 78 This interaction would give a corporation the
opportunity to self-correct before short selling becomes widespread. Asset managers, hedge funds, and other institutional investors regularly disclose stock positions to the SEC. Currently, these
reports do not have to disclose short positions."
The SEC should adopt an amendment requiring institutional investors to regularly disclose short positions. Increased disclosure requirements can help facilitate transparency leading to a
decrease in unchecked short selling. 80 Additionally, the SEC should
complete the provision of Dodd-Frank requiring it to issue rules
that would enhance public information about the lending or borrowing of securities. 81 The implementation of these changes would
produce a system of checks and balances that reduces the risk of a
future "short squeeze"1.82

V. CONCLUSION
The GameStop saga proves that the current state of securities regulation fails to protect retail investors and promote market
stability. The SEC must first direct its focus to the implementation
of instantaneous settlement in order to prevent future trading restrictions. Next, the SEC should amend current regulation with a
focus on transparency, disclosure, and the protection of retail investors. More specifically, the SEC should complete the provision
of Dodd-Frank requiring it to issue rules that would enhance public information about short selling and address PFOF's direct
" See Michaels, GameStop FrenzyPrompts SEC to Weigh More Short Sale
Transparency,supra note 7 (claiming short sales keep share prices closer to fair
market value and allow investors to hedge their risk).
78
See THE PROMISE OF MARKET REFORM, NASDAQ INC. (Feb.
2018) https://www.nasdaq.com/docs/NasdaqBlueprintto_RevitalizeCapital_MarketsApril_2018_tcm5044-43175.pdf.
" See id.
8 See Truong Duong et al., The Costs andBenefits of Short Sale Disclosure,
53 J. BANKING & FIN. 124 (Nov. 5, 2015) (finding market-wide short selling disclosure requirements led to a decrease in short selling on the Tokyo Stock Exchange).
81 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(2) (2012).
82 See Duong, supra note
80.
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conflict with a broker's Duty of Best Execution. Implementing
these changes would allow the SEC to live up to its three part mission: protecting investors, maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient
markets, and facilitating capital formation.

